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Confronting Scientific Reports Under
Crawford v. Washington
Bennett L. Gershman*
I.
In People v. Rawlins and People v. Meekins,1 the New York
Court of Appeals addressed, for the first time, the admissibility
of scientific reports prepared by non-testifying forensic experts
for use by the prosecution in a criminal trial under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.2 Rawlins involved a fin-
gerprint comparison report prepared by a police forensic ex-
pert,3 and Meekins involved a DNA profile prepared by a
technician in a private laboratory.4  The constitutional issue in
both cases was whether these reports were “testimonial” state-
ments within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington,5
and should not have been admitted into evidence unless the de-
fendants had an opportunity to cross-examine the experts who
prepared the reports.6
A. People v. Rawlins
Defendant Michael Rawlins was convicted of six counts of
third-degree burglary relating to six commercial establishments
in Manhattan.7  Latent fingerprints were found at the locations
* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace School of Law.
1. 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008). Rawlins and Meekins were consolidated on
appeal before the New York Court of Appeals. See id. at 1022.
2. Id.  The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: “In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The New York State Consti-
tution provides the same protection. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“In any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall . . . be confronted with the witnesses
against him or her.”).
3. 884 N.E.2d at 1023.
4. Id. at 1024.
5. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
6. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1022.
7. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1022.
479
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and lifted by forensic investigators who compared the prints
with the defendant’s prints, determined that the defendant’s
prints matched the latent prints, and prepared fingerprint com-
parison reports for each burglary that identified the defendant
as the perpetrator.8  Two of these comparison reports were pre-
pared by a police fingerprint expert, Detective Eric Laschke,
who testified at Rawlins’s trial, but two other reports were pre-
pared by a police fingerprint expert, Detective Artis Beatty, who
did not testify at Rawlins’s trial.9  However, another fingerprint
examiner, Detective Arthur Connolly, testified that he indepen-
dently compared all of the latent prints with the defendant’s
fingerprints and determined a match in every case with “one
hundred percent certainty.”10
Rawlins did not challenge the admissibility of the reports
prepared by Officer Laschke as a violation of his confrontation
rights.11  He did, however, challenge the admissibility of the re-
ports prepared by Officer Beatty, claiming that these reports
were “testimonial” statements against him, as defined by the
Supreme Court in Crawford, and that his inability to cross-ex-
amine the expert who prepared the reports violated his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation.12  The trial court rejected
Rawlins’s claim and admitted all four reports into evidence as
business records.13  The Appellate Division affirmed the convic-
tion,14 finding that although Detective Beatty did not testify, his
reports qualified as non-testimonial business records.15  The
court also held that even if Beatty’s reports were testimonial
under Crawford, the error was harmless because Detective Con-
nolly, who was subject to cross-examination, made his own in-
8. Id. at 1022-23.
9. Id. at 1023.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.  Rawlins also challenged the admission of the Beatty reports “on the
ground that the People failed to establish the contemporaneity requirement of the
business records exception” to the hearsay rule. Id.
13. Id.  See also People v. Guidice, 634 N.E.2d 951, 953 (N.Y. 1994) (holding
that law enforcement agencies are “businesses” for purposes of the business
records exception to the hearsay rule).
14. People v. Rawlins, 829 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (App. Div. 2007).
15. Id. at 81.
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dependent comparison of the same fingerprints tested by Beatty
and reached the same conclusion.16
B. People v. Meekins
Defendant Dwain Meekins was convicted, after a jury trial,
of sodomy, sexual abuse, and robbery.17  At his trial, the prose-
cution introduced a DNA testing report, prepared by an inde-
pendent private laboratory, on samples gathered from the
complainant’s rape kit.18  The report was introduced through
the expert testimony of Judith Floyd, an employee of the private
laboratory, and Kyra Keblish, an employee of the New York Of-
fice of the Chief Medical Examiner.19  Neither witness person-
ally performed the actual DNA tests.20
Floyd explained in detail the process her laboratory used in
performing the DNA tests.21  She testified that she supervised
the technicians who performed the tests, ensured that the tech-
nicians followed established protocols, and reviewed the final
results.22  She stated that the lab report did not make any com-
parisons; it merely generated raw data indicating that a DNA
profile from semen in the rape kit originated from a specific
male donor.23  The actual comparison between the DNA from
the complainant’s rape kit and Meekins’s DNA was made by
Keblish.24  Keblish testified that her laboratory analyzed the
raw data, distinguished the DNA profile of the complainant
from the donor’s DNA profile, and after being notified by the
Division of Criminal Justice Services that the semen donor bore
the same DNA profile as Meekins, concluded that the DNA pro-
file from the rape kit matched the DNA of Meekins.25  Keblish
16. Id.
17. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1024.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1024 n.5.  Floyd explained that a forensic examiner removes DNA
from the sample in question and then subjects the sample to an amplification pro-
cedure called polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to evaluate and obtain a genetic
profile. Id.  According to Floyd, the PCR process is “ ‘widely used across the coun-
try in every laboratory.’” Id.
22. Id. at 1024.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1025.
25. Id.
3
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opined that the probability that the DNA originated from a per-
son other than Meekins was one in one trillion.26
Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted
both the lab reports from the private laboratory and the Medi-
cal Examiner’s Office as business records, finding that both
were prepared and maintained by those entities in the regular
course of business.27  The Appellate Division affirmed the con-
viction,28 finding that Keblish’s testimony was sufficient to lay
the foundation for the introduction of the private laboratory’s
DNA report as a business record and that the admission of that
report did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights be-
cause business records are “ ‘by their nature . . . not
testimonial.’ ”29
C. Court of Appeals’ Holding
In Rawlins, the Court of Appeals granted leave to resolve
this issue of first impression: whether a latent fingerprint com-
parison report and a DNA report prepared by two non-testifying
experts are “testimonial” statements pursuant to Crawford.30
First, the court analyzed Crawford to ascertain the Supreme
Court’s meaning of the term “testimonial” under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.31  Next, the court ex-
amined whether “testimonial” statements, as defined by Craw-
ford, include not only statements of live witnesses, but also
statements contained in business records.32  The court deter-
mined that some business records might be viewed as “testimo-
nial” statements under Crawford, particularly scientific reports
prepared by non-testifying experts for later use at a criminal
trial, and provided an analytical framework to make that deter-
mination.33  Finally, the court applied this framework to the la-
tent fingerprint comparison report in Rawlins and the DNA
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. People v. Meekins, 828 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 2006).
29. Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 56 (2004)).
30. 884 N.E.2d at 1022.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/6
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report in Meekins and held that the fingerprint report was testi-
monial and that the DNA report was not.34
II. “Testimonial” Statements Under Crawford
The Court of Appeals initially examined the Supreme
Court’s decision in Crawford to discern its understanding of the
Confrontation Clause as it applies to out-of-court statements of-
fered by the prosecution against an accused.35  Prior to Craw-
ford, the Supreme Court, under the test articulated in Ohio v.
Roberts,36 reviewed the admissibility of out-of-court statements
by determining whether the statements possessed “adequate
‘indicia of reliability’”37 or fell within “a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.”38  In Crawford, the Court emphatically rejected this
approach as unfaithful to the original meaning of the Confron-
tation Clause.39  The Court explained that “the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law
mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.”40
In Crawford, the Court provided several examples of ex
parte statements: affidavits, depositions, custodial examina-
tions, confessions, prior testimony, and other extrajudicial dec-
larations “ ‘that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use at a later trial.’ ”41  The “com-
mon nucleus” to these several formulations,42 according to the
Court, is the use of out-of-court statements that “bear testi-
mony” against an accused.43  The Court stated that testimony
“is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
34. See infra Part IV.A-B.
35. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1025-29.
36. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
37. Id. at 66.
38. Id.
39. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60, 68-69 (2004).  The Supreme
Court stated that constitutional concerns do “not evaporate when testimony hap-
pens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception.” Id. at 56 n.7.
40. Id. at 50.
41. Id. at 51-52 (quoting Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-
9410)).
42. Id. at 52.
43. Id. at 51.
5
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purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ”44  And if a state-
ment is testimonial, the Confrontation Clause bars the use by
the prosecution of such statements “unless [the witness] was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior oppor-
tunity for cross-examination.”45
As the Court of Appeals observed, the Supreme Court did
not define the term “testimonial,” but it offered several clues as
to its meaning.46  The Court of Appeals noted Crawford’s con-
cern with the “inquisitorial practices and their modern ana-
logs”47 exemplified by a witness’s prior testimony and police
interrogations.  Specifically, the Crawford Court stated that
“[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testi-
mony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for
prosecutorial abuse.”48  Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded
that “ ‘when the government is involved in the statements’ pro-
duction, and when the statements describe past events,’ they
‘implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit prac-
tice.’”49  The court also interpreted Crawford as finding that
when determining whether a statement is testimonial, the for-
mality of an out-of-court statement may be a relevant consider-
ation.50  For example, the Crawford Court stated that “[a]n
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not.”51
In Davis v. Washington,52 the Supreme Court amplified the
meaning of “testimonial” in the context of police interrogations
44. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
45. Id. at 54.
46. People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (N.Y. 2008).
47. Id. (quoting 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 252,
at 158 (6th ed. 2006)). See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“These are the modern
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed.”).
48. 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. See also Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1026 (quoting same).
49. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1026 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137
(1999)).
50. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52).
51. 541 U.S. at 51. See also Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1026 (quoting same).  In
Crawford, the police interrogated and recorded statements made by the defen-
dant’s wife while she was in police custody, after having been given Miranda warn-
ings as a possible suspect herself.  541 U.S. at 38.
52. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/6
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of witnesses under differing circumstances.53 Davis involved
statements made during a 911 call by a victim of domestic vio-
lence who, in response to questions from the 911 police opera-
tor, described the assault as it was happening and identified
her assailant.54  The victim did not appear at trial, and her
statements to the police were admitted to prove the assault and
the identity of the perpetrator.55  The Court held that these
statements were not testimonial because “the primary purpose
of the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. . . . [and not] to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”56  As
the Court of Appeals noted, Davis suggests that even though an
out-of-court statement is generated by police interrogation and
is accusatory, it is critical to determine whether the purpose of
the statement is accusatory (i.e., accuses a perpetrator of a
crime, which is “ ‘precisely what a witness does on direct exami-
nation,’” or serves some other purpose, such as dealing with an
ongoing emergency).57
The companion case to Davis, Hammon v. Indiana, in-
volved a statement from the defendant’s wife taken by the po-
lice who had come to the couple’s home after a report of a
domestic disturbance.58  Finding the situation calm when they
arrived, the police escorted the wife to a separate room, kept her
husband away, and obtained a detailed account of what her
husband had done.59  The wife did not appear at her husband’s
trial, and her statements were introduced through a police wit-
ness to prove the assault and the identity of her assailant.60  In
contrast to the statements in Davis, the Court held that the
53. See id. at 817.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 818-19.
56. Id. at 822.
57. People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1027 (N.Y. 2008) (quoting Davis, 547
U.S. at 830).  After Davis, the New York Court of Appeals has considered this issue
in two cases.  See People v. Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (N.Y. 2007)
(holding that statements elicited from a victim are not testimonial where police
officers reasonably assumed that there was an ongoing emergency); People v.
Bradley, 862 N.E.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. 2006) (same).
58. 547 U.S. at 819-20. Davis and Hammon were consolidated on appeal to
the Supreme Court. See id. at 817.
59. Id. at 819-20.
60. Id. at 820.
7
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wife’s statements to the police were testimonial and that the
admission of these statements at trial violated the defendant’s
confrontation rights.61  According to the Court, the interroga-
tion of the wife took place well after the events described were
over and was part of an investigation into potentially past crim-
inal conduct by her husband.62  In other words, there was no
ongoing emergency, as was the case in Davis.63  The Court rea-
soned that “[s]uch statements under official interrogation are
an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do pre-
cisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are in-
herently testimonial.”64
III. Applying Crawford to Business Records
In Crawford, the Court emphasized that not all hearsay ev-
idence is necessarily “testimonial,”65 and Davis, by exempting
the declarant’s hearsay statements in response to police interro-
gation to deal with an ongoing emergency, reinforced that pro-
position.66  As the Crawford Court observed, hearsay evidence
that bears “little resemblance to the civil-law abuses” does not
implicate Sixth Amendment concerns.67  Indeed, “[m]ost of the
hearsay exceptions [at common law] covered statements that by
their nature were not testimonial—for example, business
records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.”68  Moreo-
ver, a business record is not typically created for investigative
or prosecutorial purposes, but rather encompasses the “routine
61. Id. at 834.
62. Id. at 830.
63. See id. at 828.
64. Id. at 830.
65. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
66. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
67. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  On this point, the Court further stated that
“[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Fram-
ers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . .
as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny altogether.” Id. at 68.
68. Id. at 56.  The Court also suggested that dying declarations may be a sui
generis example of testimonial hearsay that was admissible at common law. See
id. at 56 n.6 (“The one deviation we have found involves dying declarations.  The
existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be
disputed. . . .  We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment incor-
porates an exception for testimonial dying declarations.  If this exception must be
accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” (citations omitted)).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/6
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-3\PLR306.txt unknown Seq: 9  2-JUL-09 13:00
2009] CONFRONTING SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 487
reflections of day-to-day operations” of an enterprise and is in-
tended to be a truthful and accurate recounting of these routine
operations to enable the enterprise to conduct itself properly
and efficiently.69 Crawford’s apparent exclusion of business
records from the “testimonial” category of hearsay was dicta,70
however, and lower courts have reached different conclusions as
to whether official reports that meet the definition of a business
record are exempt from the Confrontation Clause, even though
the official who prepared the report did not testify and therefore
could not be cross-examined.71
As the Rawlins court observed, several lower courts, rely-
ing on this dicta in Crawford, have established a bright line rule
that business records “by their nature [are] not testimonial.”72
69. People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1028 (N.Y. 2008).
70. See U.S. v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1238 (2007) (“[W]e acknowledge that several courts have rejected arguments simi-
lar to the Government’s, characterizing Crawford’s reference to business records
as dicta . . . .” (citing State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 398-99 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005);
People v. Mitchell, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 621 (Ct. App. 2005))).
71. See cases cited infra note 72 (noting cases holding that business records
are not testimonial).  In contrast, courts have found that evidence classifiable as
business records may, in fact, be “testimonial.” See, e.g., Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d
615, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an affidavit confirming a
breathalyzer’s maintenance, prepared by the arresting officer who did not perform
said maintenance, was testimonial evidence); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610,
618 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (finding testimony as to the substance and conclusion of
a lab report testimonial hearsay); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn.
2006) (“The report conforms to the types of statements about which the Court in
Crawford expressed concern—affidavits and similar documents admitted in lieu of
present testimony at trial.”); State v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1088 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 2007) (holding that a report detailing the procedures followed in drawing
the defendant’s blood was testimonial). Crawford’s apparent exemption of busi-
ness records—and possibly official records—from the category of testimonial hear-
say was specifically cited with approval by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who observed:
“To its credit, the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some hearsay
exceptions, such as business records and official records.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at
76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
72. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1028 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56). See, e.g.,
Feliz, 467 F.3d at 233-34 (“[Business records] cannot be testimonial because [they
are] fundamentally inconsistent with what the Supreme Court has suggested com-
prise the defining characteristic of testimonial evidence.”); People v. Grogan, 816
N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 854 N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y. 2006) (holding
that DNA reports are business records that are “by their nature . . . not testimo-
nial”); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (“Under Crawford
business records are specifically exempted from challenge because they are outside
the ‘core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude.’”); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021
9
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According to this approach, a business record is not a testimo-
nial statement because the admission of such evidence does not
implicate the kinds of ex parte abuses at which, under Craw-
ford, the Confrontation Clause was directed.73  Moreover, busi-
ness records do not resemble the examples of testimonial
evidence the Crawford Court identified, such as affidavits, cus-
todial interrogations, depositions, prior testimony, and confes-
sions.74  Indeed, under the traditional hearsay exception for
business records, a document must have been created and re-
tained in the regular course of a business activity and must not
have been created in anticipation of litigation, as the examples
of ex parte statements in Crawford surely were.75
In Rawlins, the Court of Appeals rejected the mechanical,
bright line approach of those courts that have interpreted
Crawford as automatically classifying business records as non-
testimonial.76  The court found it plausible that some business
records are created, to use one of Crawford’s formulations of
“testimonial” statements, “ ‘under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use at a later trial.’ ”77  Notwith-
standing the inherent reliability of business records and the
fact that such records encompass a “firmly rooted” hearsay ex-
ception, the Court of Appeals pointed out that under Crawford,
these considerations are no longer relevant; “the real inquiry
concerns whether a statement is ‘testimonial’ as that term is
now understood after Crawford and Davis.”78  The Court of Ap-
peals observed that constitutional concerns do “ ‘not evaporate
(2006) (“The distinction between business records and testimonial evidence is
readily seen.  Among other attributes, business records are neutral, are created to
serve a number of purposes important to the creating organization, and are not
inherently subject to manipulation or abuse.”); State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15 (Or.
Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, 132 P.3d 28 (Or. 2006) (“[T]he certifications of the
accuracy of an Intoxilyzer machine in Oregon are more akin to hearsay statements
that were not considered testimonial in nature at common law, such as public or
business records.”).
73. See Feliz, 467 F.3d at 234; People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 136 (Cal. 2007).
74. See, e.g., Feliz, 467 F.3d at 232-34.
75. See id. at 234.
76. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1028. (“[A] bright line rule could run afoul of ei-
ther our Federal or State Constitutions, and most especially in certain types of
police business records.”).
77. Id. at 1026 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52).
78. Id. at 1028.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/6
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when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern
hearsay exception.’”79  The critical inquiry for a court is to eval-
uate case-by-case, and under a “multifaceted prism that prop-
erly reflects the ‘core’ evil the Confrontation Clause was
designed to prevent . . . [,] whether a statement is properly
viewed as a surrogate for accusatory in-court testimony.”80
The Court of Appeals also rejected a bright line approach
that would mechanically denominate as “testimonial” any re-
cord that was prepared by a person who might reasonably ex-
pect that such a record would be available at trial.81  For
example, a forensic expert who analyzes a blood sample, identi-
fies a substance as cocaine, performs a ballistic test on a bullet,
analyzes the results of a breathalyzer test, or performs an au-
topsy might reasonably expect that the ensuing report would be
available for use at a subsequent criminal trial.82  However, as
Davis confirms, that expectation is merely one factor in the
analysis of whether a statement is testimonial.83  The Rawlins
court noted that the victim in Davis could reasonably have ex-
pected that her statements to the police would be available as
evidence against her attacker at trial.84  However, as the court
stated, the critical inquiry should focus not merely on the de-
clarant’s reasonable expectations, but rather on the circum-
stances under which the statement was made and “must
account for various indicia of testimoniality beyond the declar-
ant’s reasonable expectations.”85
IV. Applying Crawford to Records of Scientific Tests
Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed the critical inquiry
in Rawlins and Meekins: assuming that records of scientific
79. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7).
80. Id. at 1029.
81. Id. (“[W]e decline to adopt the approach by other courts to hinge our deter-
mination on the expectation that a statement will be available at trial . . . .”). See
also id. (“ ‘Following Davis, it cannot be that a statement is testimonial in every
case where a declarant reasonably expects that it might be used prosecutorially.’”
(quoting State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 10 (N.H. 2007))).
82. See id. at 1030-31.
83. See id. at 1029 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826-29 (2006)).
84. See id. (“[S]he could well have expected her statements to be used against
defendant later at trial.” (citing Davis, 547 U.S. 813)).
85. Id.
11
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tests may constitute “testimonial” statements under Crawford,
are the fingerprint comparison report in Rawlins and the DNA
laboratory report in Meekins “testimonial” statements within
the meaning of Crawford?86  In order to answer this question,
the court explained, it must consider various factors, not all of
which are equally important in every case.87  While “facts and
context are essential,”88 two other factors “play an especially im-
portant role in this determination: first, whether the statement
was prepared in a manner resembling ex parte examination and
second, whether the statement accuses defendant of criminal
wrongdoing.”89  The purpose of making or generating the state-
ment, and the declarant’s motive for doing so, inform these con-
siderations.90  The court applied this framework to the
fingerprint and DNA reports, concluding that the former was
testimonial and that the latter was not.91
A. Rawlins Fingerprint Report
The Court of Appeals found that the fingerprint reports
prepared by Beatty were “clearly testimonial,”92 first, because
Beatty, a police detective, prepared his reports exclusively for
the prosecutorial purpose of “apprehend[ing] a perpetrator,”93
and, second, because the reports were “inherently accusatory”
in that they established the perpetrator’s identity.94  Moreover,
Beatty’s gathering of evidence of a past crime—the latent prints
found at the crime scene—and comparing that evidence with
known prints was done for the exclusive purpose of solving a
crime.95  According to the court, this type of evidence “fit the
classic definition of ‘a weaker substitute for live testimony’” at
86. See id. at 1022, 1033, 1044.
87. Id. at 1031-32.  The court cited three cases as containing “instructive” in-
sights and reasoning. Id. at 1030-32 (citing People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal.
2007); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005); State v. Crager, 879
N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 2007)).
88. Id. at 1033.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1033-36.
92. Id. at 1033.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/6
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-3\PLR306.txt unknown Seq: 13  2-JUL-09 13:00
2009] CONFRONTING SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 491
trial.96  Through his reports, Beatty effectively “testified” that
the defendant was the same person who committed the burgla-
ries.97  Had Beatty witnessed the commission of the crime, the
court noted, “he would have testified in like fashion.”98  More-
over, Beatty’s fingerprint comparison methodology—“an admit-
tedly inexact science”99—and his rendering of a plainly
“controvertible opinion”100 were admitted into evidence without
the defendant being able to confront Beatty’s accusatory conclu-
sions through cross-examination.101
B. Meekins DNA Test
In contrast to the Rawlins fingerprint report, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the private laboratory’s DNA report
was not a testimonial record.102  To be sure, as the court stated,
the laboratory report arguably could be considered testimonial
under one of the Crawford formulations of “testimonial” (i.e.,
when a declarant reasonably expects that the results of the test-
ing could potentially be used to prosecute the individual ulti-
mately identified).103  However, the fact that the lab technicians
knew that their tests might be used in a subsequent criminal
prosecution of someone was “of no moment.”104  The court rea-
soned that “[n]either the prosecution nor law enforcement could
have influenced the outcome; the government’s involvement is
inconsequential.”105
96. Id. at 1033 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 1023.  The court, nevertheless, found the error in admitting the
Beatty reports to be harmless. Id. at 1034.  Detective Connolly, an expert who did
testify, reached the same conclusion as Beatty after comparing the latent prints
with Rawlins’s prints, and therefore Beatty’s reports were “cumulative.” Id.  The
court rejected the defendant’s argument that he needed to confront Beatty directly
because different experts may disagree as to number and quality of points of iden-
tity necessary to make a fingerprint comparison, finding that “where the jury
heard defendant’s questioning of Connolly and Laschke, we are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that Beatty’s improperly admitted reports did not influence the
outcome.” Id.
102. Id. at 1034.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1035.
105. Id.
13
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Also, in marked contrast to the fingerprint reports, the
DNA records prepared by the lab technicians were not accusa-
tory since no technician performed any forensic testing that
could remotely be described as “bear[ing] witness.”106  The lab
report contained only “raw data” in the form of a DNA profile of
an unknown male obtained from semen in a rape kit.107  In con-
trast with the fingerprint report, this “graphical” information
was neutral rather than accusatory.108  The DNA report “stand-
ing alone, shed no light on the guilt of the accused in the ab-
sence of an expert’s opinion that the results genetically match a
known sample.”109  The data contained in the lab report, accord-
ing to the court, was “not the kind of ex parte testimony the
Confrontation Clause was designed to protect against.”110
Additionally, unlike the fingerprint report, the DNA testing
procedures employed by the lab technicians involved neither
discretion nor opinion, and they did not “concern the exercise of
fallible human judgment over questions of cause and effect.”111
The technicians performed well-recognized, objective scientific
tests and contemporaneously recorded the procedures employed
and the results obtained.112  Reviewers could verify their work,
as the supervising witness confirmed in her testimony about the
laboratory’s protocols and procedures.113  Further, even though
the lab technicians were aware that they were performing work
for law enforcement, the government’s involvement, if any,
could not have influenced the outcome.114  And to the extent
that errors could have been made during the testing process,
those errors, according to the court, “are not the product of ‘tes-
timony’ as we understand the term.”115  It was left to the testify-
ing witnesses to draw inferences from this raw data and make
comparisons that directly linked the defendant to the crime.116
106. Id. at 1032.
107. Id. at 1034.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1035.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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V. Conclusion
The extent to which scientific reports are “testimonial”
statements within the meaning of Crawford has been addressed
by several federal and state courts in the context of various sci-
entific reports, such as DNA, blood, fingerprint, breathalyzer,
autopsy, drugs, and other forensic tests.117  In People v. Rawlins
and People v. Meekins, the New York Court of Appeals ex-
amined the issue in the context of fingerprint comparison re-
ports and DNA tests.118  Noting the absence of any consensus
from the federal and state courts and rejecting the bright-line
approach adopted by some courts, the Court of Appeals formu-
lated a multifaceted framework to analyze whether scientific re-
ports are “testimonial” statements under Crawford.119
In making this determination, according to the court, the
facts and context of each case are critical, and no one factor is
necessarily dispositive.120  The extent to which a scientific re-
port resembles ex parte testimony and “bears witness” is a
starting point.121  As the Supreme Court observed in Davis, de-
termining whether a statement is “testimonial” necessitates an
inquiry into the purpose of the statement.122  A report is more
likely to be deemed “testimonial” if the purpose of the report is
accusatory, as the fingerprint report in Rawlins surely was.123
A report is less likely to be deemed “testimonial” if the purpose
of the report is not to make an identification of any particular
suspect but merely to analyze neutral data objectively, as did
the lab technicians in conducting DNA tests in Meekins.124
Moreover, the extent to which a report contains an expert’s sub-
jective judgments and opinions is also an important considera-
tion in suggesting the need for confrontation and cross-
examination in order to expose any fallible and defective conclu-
sions the expert may have made.125  Thus, the expert’s finger-
print comparisons in Rawlins involved subjective opinions and
117. See id. at 1033. See also cases cited supra notes 71 and 72.
118. See Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1022.
119. See id. at 1030-33.
120. Id. at 1033.
121. Id. at 1032-33.
122. Id. at 1027 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828, 830 (2006)).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1032, 1034-35.
125. See id. at 1031, 1033, 1035.
15
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judgments that required confrontation and cross-examination
to evaluate the reliability of those opinions.126  By contrast, the
expert’s DNA conclusions in Meekins involved objective descrip-
tions and measurements of raw data in order to generate a DNA
profile of a male donor.127  Confrontation and cross-examination
in such a case would be neither necessary nor productive in
terms of determining the reliability of the test and the accuracy
of the results.128
In conclusion, there is still considerable room for discussion
and disagreement over the extent to which Crawford applies to
hearsay exceptions such as business and public records.  To be
sure, after Crawford, the interpretation of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause has been radically transformed.
Further elucidation by the Supreme Court will be needed to
clarify the meaning and scope of the Confrontation Clause.  In
People v. Rawlins, the New York Court of Appeals has produced
a careful and well-reasoned decision that aids this process.
Postscript
On June 25, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,129 ruling that a scientific re-
port prepared by a state forensic laboratory certifying that a
substance submitted by police for chemical testing contained co-
caine constitutes a testimonial statement within the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington.  In a
5-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court
wrote: “There is little doubt that the documents at issue in this
case fall within the ‘core class of testimonial statements’” cov-
ered by the Confrontation Clause.130  As the Court observed, the
documents were denominated “certificates,” but they were
“plainly affidavits” that contained sworn factual assertions that
were “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing
‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’”131  More-
over, the “sole purpose” of the certificates was to provide the
126. See id. at 1033.
127. See id. at 1034-35.
128. See id. at 1035.
129. No. 07-391, 2009 WL 1789468 (U.S. June 25, 2009).
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
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prosecution with “prima facie evidence of the composition, qual-
ity, and net weight” of the analyzed substances, and the ana-
lysts were presumably aware of this purpose.132  Absent a
showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial
and that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-ex-
amine them, the defendant “was entitled to ‘be confronted with’
the analysts at trial.”133
Under Melendez-Diaz, the decision by the New York Court
of Appeals in Rawlins and Meekins appears to be a correct un-
derstanding of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington.  Thus, the Court of
Appeals correctly determined that the fingerprint report in
Rawlins was “clearly testimonial” under Crawford, and that the
DNA laboratory report in Meekins was not a testimonial record
under Crawford.
Initially, several preliminary points should be noted.  First,
that the lab certificates in Melendez-Diaz were denominated by
the Court as “affidavits” suggests that any scientific report that
contains a certification by an analyst that a scientific test was
done properly, in accordance with accepted protocols and proce-
dures, and that the results are accurate, may as a threshold
matter constitute a testimonial statement under the Confronta-
tion Clause.  Under Melendez-Diaz, this conclusion would al-
ways seem to be the case where the report appears to be
functionally identical to live, in-court testimony establishing a
critical element of the government’s case.  To be sure, the Court
of Appeals in Rawlins did not discuss whether the fingerprint
and DNA reports were sworn to or certified; it considered these
reports within the context of the business records exception to
the hearsay rule, as did the Appellate Division.  But it would be
illogical to hold that a scientific report that is sworn to or certi-
fied is a testimonial statement within the Confrontation Clause,
but that a report that is neither sworn to or certified is not a
testimonial statement.  Surely the result in Melendez-Diaz
would have been the same in the absence of any requirement
that the reports be sworn to or certified.
132. Id. at *4.
133. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
17
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Additionally, the question of whether official or business
records are within or exempt from the Confrontation Clause—
an issue that was discussed at length in Rawlins and served as
the basis for the decisions by the Appellate Division—was men-
tioned briefly by the Court in Melendez-Diaz. The Court ob-
served that under the traditional hearsay exception, if a
document is kept in the regular course of business, it may be
admitted at trial despite its hearsay status.  But, the Court cau-
tioned, “that is not the case if the regularly conducted business
activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.”134 By way
of contrast, the Court also pointed out that some documents
that are offered in evidence at a criminal trial that are prepared
by an entity, for example, “in the regular course of equipment
maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.”135
Under Melendez-Diaz, the fingerprint report in Rawlins, as
the New York Court of Appeals concluded, would clearly appear
to be a testimonial statement under Crawford. As in Melendez-
Diaz, the fingerprint report was clearly an accusatory state-
ment; indeed, it was even more accusatory than the lab report
in Melendez-Diaz.  Just as the lab report in Melendez-Diaz pro-
vided testimony against petitioner by proving an essential fact
necessary for conviction—that the substance possessed by de-
fendant was cocaine—the fingerprint report in Rawlins estab-
lished circumstantially the perpetrator’s identity.  In addition,
just as the sole purpose of the lab report in Melendez-Diaz was
to provide prima facie evidence of the incriminating nature of
the substance, the sole purpose of the fingerprint report, as the
Court of Appeals noted, was to “apprehend a perpetrator.”136
Finally, just as the Court in Melendez-Diaz noted as a critical
reason for cross-examination of a forensic expert the widely doc-
umented concerns over manipulation, subjectivity, and bias in
forensic testing,137 the Court of Appeals in Rawlins similarly ob-
served that fingerprint comparison methodology is “an admit-
134. Id. at *10.  For this principle, the Court cited the leading case of Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
135. Melendez-Diaz, 2009 WL 1789468, at *4 n.1.
136. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
137. Melendez-Diaz, 2009 WL 1789468, at *8-9.
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tedly inexact science”138 that produces a “controvertible
opinion.”139
The correctness of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion in Mee-
kins that the DNA lab report is not a testimonial statement
under Crawford is a somewhat closer question, but from the
language in Melendez-Diaz, there appears to be a sound justifi-
cation for that conclusion.  First, in contrast to the lab report in
Melendez-Diaz and the fingerprint report in Rawlins, the lab
report in Meekins was in no sense accusatory. The lab techni-
cians merely performed an analysis of a substance to determine
the existence of a DNA profile; the report contained only “raw
data” that was neutral rather than accusatory. Standing alone,
it shed no light on the guilt of the accused. Indeed, the lab re-
port would be more akin to a police investigator’s dusting and
lifting of the fingerprints in Rawlins, and there is no suggestion
in Melendez-Diaz that such a report of the existence of a finger-
print “bears witness” against the accused of the kind that the
Confrontation Clause is designed to protect against.
Moreover, in contrast to the certificates prepared by the an-
alyst in Melendez-Diaz, the “sole purpose” of the analyst’s lab
report in Meekins, as the Court of Appeals observed, was to gen-
erate “raw data” for another expert to make a comparison.140 To
be sure, the lab technician in Meekins presumably was aware
that the results of the test—i.e., the generation of a DNA pro-
file—could potentially be used to prosecute an individual.  How-
ever, that type of awareness seems more like the knowledge of
an investigator who lifts a fingerprint from a crime scene, which
fingerprint will be relied on by the live testimony of an expert,
who has made a comparison with the defendant’s fingerprints,
or a live witness who gives expert testimony that the DNA pro-
file matches a defendant’s DNA, as was the case in Meekins.
Finally, the Court in Melendez-Diaz tempered the most ex-
treme concerns of critics over the scope of its ruling by appear-
ing to exempt from the scope of Crawford’s coverage the
suggestion that “everyone who laid hands on the evidence” must
be called as a witness.141  The Court pointed out that many per-
138. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1034.
141. Melendez-Diaz, 2009 WL 1789468, at *4 n.1.
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sons who are involved in the scientific testing do not necessarily
provide testimony within the meaning of Crawford. There is no
basis to suggest that “anyone whose testimony may be relevant
in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample,
or accuracy of the testing device must appear in person as part
of the prosecution’s case.”142  The prosecution has discretion to
decide what evidence needs to be produced without necessarily
calling live witnesses, such as proving the reliability of a finger-
print comparison without calling the investigator who lifted the
fingerprints in Rawlins, or proving the reliability of the DNA
comparison in Meekins without introducing the analyst who
prepared the DNA profile.  In other words, gaps in the chain of
custody, authenticity of the sample, and accuracy of the testing
device “normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility.”143
142. Id.
143. Id.
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